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ABSTRACT: Predoctrinal deliberations about the employment of
the US armed forces, captured in Joint Doctrine Notes, remain
critically understudied. Using comparative text analysis, this article
identifies changes in recent Joint Doctrine Note depictions of military
strategy. These changes risk distorting the logic of military strategy,
sacrificing means-ends integration to organizational impulse, and
raising the prospect of future shortfalls in US strategic effectiveness.

I

n December 2019, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released
a new Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) on military strategy, JDN 2-19.
The note differs from its predecessor, JDN 1-18, in significant ways.
Perhaps most notably, 2-19 expands on conventional characterizations
of military strategy. Per JDN 2-19, strategy encompasses more than
the designated employment of the military instrument “to secure the
objectives of national policy.”1 The document specifically requires the
creation of “friendly advantages . . . at the expense of the competitor
or adversary.”2 This modification, we contend, risks removing military
strategy from its foundational logic, substituting organizational impulse
for means-end integration and jeopardizing future strategic effectiveness.
The following sections provide theoretical grounding, evidentiary
support, and practical context for our argument. First, the article examines
classical accounts of the logic of military strategy, asking whether
shifting doctrinal depictions of strategy run counter to that logic. The
article then provides a comparative textual analysis of select sections
from JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19, lending substantiation to the claim that
the two differ from each other in meaningful ways. The article identifies
evidence of divergent portrayals of military strategy, highlighting JDN
1-18’s emphasis on means-ends integration and JDN 2-19’s embrace
of military organizational impulse. Finally, the article addresses the
implications of this variance for the future of US strategic effectiveness,
particularly in the context of re-emergent great-power competition. The
article warns JDN 2-19 may be a harbinger of regression in US military
strategic thought and urges decisionmakers to engage rather than evade the
complexities of means-ends integration.
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-18 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018), I-7, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf ?ver=
2018-04-25-150439-540.
2. JCS, Strategy, JDN 2-19 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), II-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_19.pdf ?ver=2019-12-20-093655-890.
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Means-Ends Integration: Logic and Obstacles
Clausewitz defines strategy as “the use of engagements for the
object of the war.”3 This definition, along with the well-known “war
is an instrument of policy” dictum, informs most contemporary
understandings of military strategy.4 They also distinguish its chief
function: bridging military means to political ends.5 Absent this function,
“there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price
in blood and treasure.”6 Underscoring strategy’s rational-utilitarian
logic, Richard Betts notes that
one must be able to devise a rational scheme to achieve an objective through
combat or the threat of it; implement the scheme with forces; keep the
plan working in the face of enemy reactions (which should be anticipated
in the plan); and achieve something close to the objective. Rational strategic
behavior should be value maximizing, choosing appropriate means according
to economistic calculations of cost and benefit.7

In other words, strategic effectiveness (success in bringing about
the attainment of political ends) requires consideration of the costs of
military options relative to one another, the costs of these options relative
to the benefits of specified policy aims, and such costs relative to risks
inherent to the strategic situation. Further utility-relevant deliberations
might center on the prioritization of military resources, the sequencing
of military activity, or the theory of how success will be achieved.8
Though superficially straightforward, the rational-utilitarian
reconciliation of means to ends is susceptible to “thousands of
diversions.”9 Though it may not guarantee battlefield success—the
enemy, after all, gets a vote—political-military integration is almost
certainly necessary for strategic success.10 Fog (uncertainty) and friction
(danger, physical exertion, and intelligence gaps that impede action) are
ever-present factors in war and strategy.11 Political leaders are inclined
to seek ambitious and ambiguous political ends absent an understanding
of the limits of military force; military leaders are liable to curb political
inputs that run afoul of military expertise. Strategic cultural biases,
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, indexed ed., trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128.
4. Clausewitz, On War, 605–10.
5. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17; and
Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 5–6.
6. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 5.
7. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 6.
8. Eliot A. Cohen, “What’s Obama’s Counterinsurgency Strategy for Afghanistan?,” Washington
Post, December 6, 2009, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/04
/AR2009120402602.html; and Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends+Ways+Means=(Bad) Strategy,” Parameters
46, no. 4 (2016): 81–91.
9. Clausewitz, On War, 178.
10. James Mattis, “Meet the Press,” NBC, video (no longer available), October 13, 2019; and
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25–29.
11. Clausewitz, On War, 122.
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tense or imbalanced civil-military relations, and leaders’ cognitive
psychological pathologies interfere with strategic decision making.12
Attempts at evading or bypassing the myriad predicaments of
strategy are apt to prove untenable. The purposeful engagement with
means-ends dilemmas is both necessary and advantageous.13 This
engagement affords alternatives to brute-force attrition, enhances the
value of existing resources, acts as a force multiplier, provides options for
besting equally capable adversaries, and mitigates the costs of defeating
weaker ones.14
While most obstacles to means-ends integration fall outside the
control of the Joint Force, one exists well within its purview: the
military’s organizational penchant for pursuing certainty. This quest
for certainty may influence the adoption of standardized procedures,
the reliance on technocratic expertise, or the related preference for
offense (and annihilation). In theory, offense enables management of
an uncertain and threat-riddled security environment; defense requires
responsiveness to that environment. Offensive plans, capabilities,
posturing, and operations—the argument goes—alleviate fog and
friction.15 This perspective colors military technocratic protocols that
help depoliticize use-of-force policy debates, augment military budgets,
and enhance organizational autonomy.16
Despite their ostensible appeal, offensive plans, capabilities,
posturing, and operations do not yield cure-all effects. Friction,
for example, is largely impervious to defensive and offensive plans,
as adversary behavior ensures war rarely proceeds “according to
expectations.”17 Further, blind adherence to offense may yield an
outbreak of war consistent with the spiral model or may result in strategic
failures: the adoption of (perceived) offensive capabilities or posturing
may spark rival fears and in-kind responses, seeding unforeseen war,
as illustrated by the onset of World War I.18 Notwithstanding the
offensive arms race that triggered that war and indications that military
technologies of the time favored defense, both the Entente Powers and
the Central Powers went on to assume offense-centric strategies. France,
which implemented a distinctly offensive “single combat doctrine”
despite apparent barriers to its success, spent much of the war seeking
to overcome the plan’s costly shortfalls.19
Given the problems outlined above, what tools might serve as
effective checks against undue organizational impulse or as effective
12. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”
13. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 25–29.
14. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 6, 8, 50.
15. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 48; and Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), xxii.
16. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 49; and Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult
of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 109.
17. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 37.
18. Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 119.
19. Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,”
International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 60.
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safeguards of means-ends integration? Scholars skeptical of military
self-regulation in strategy call for active civilian intervention in strategy
processes.20 Others offer a somewhat less cynical alternative. Military
mindfulness, encompassed in doctrine, enhances the likelihood of
overcoming organizational blind spots and achieving strategic effects.21
The following comparative analysis of the texts of Joint Doctrine
Notes 1-18 and 2-19 seeks evidence of competing predoctrinal
characterizations of strategy. More specifically, the discussion examines
2-19 for recurrent text indicators linking the organizational preference
for offense as the presumed mitigation of uncertainty. Does the language
of JDN 2-19 evince bias for organizational predisposition, and if so,
does that bias risk distorting strategy’s means-ends logic?

Ends-Ways-Means versus Organizational Impulse

Doctrine outlines standards for the management of force
employment or “fundamental principles” for the conduct of operations.22
Strategy-centric doctrine connects operational conduct to the logic
of strategy. Such doctrine does not advance a particular strategy or
set of strategies over another but provides guidance for identifying
and overcoming barriers to strategic effectiveness.23 Both JDN 1-18
and JDN 2-19 provide insights into ongoing deliberations about the
substance of US military strategy and how this strategy should be
depicted in Joint Doctrine. The comparison that follows reveals a
doctrinal shift away from strategic process thinking as it relates to the
formulation, implementation, assessment, and adaptation or innovation
of military strategy. Should the contents of JDN 2-19 be reflected in
doctrine, their inclusion could have significant ramifications for the
Joint Force’s approach to military strategy.

Strategy Formulation

Comparison. Both JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19 introduce strategy
formulation as a task founded on rationalist means-ends logic, noting
this process requires consideration of the following questions:
1. Where do we want to go, or what are the desired ends?
2. How do we get there, or what are the ways?
3. What resources are available, or what are the means?
4. What are the risks and costs associated with the strategy?24
Beyond this point, the documents’ strategy-making guidance
diverges. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 repeatedly calls for the development
of “ends-ways-means-risks/costs” connections that aid the strategic
20. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 49, 53–54, 58–59.
21. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” 39; and Gray, Modern Strategy.
22. Aaron P. Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine: Change and Continuity in Understanding the
Practice of Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 6; and Posen,
Sources of Military Doctrine.
23. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine; and Jackson, Roots of Military Doctrine.
24. JCS, JDN 1-18, I-1, I-2–I-3; and JCS, JDN 2-19, I-1.
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situation and ultimately serve political ends.25 Strategy formulation
requires the regular engagement of assorted participants: elected
officials, political appointees, career bureaucrats, and military leaders.
Curtailing their inputs jeopardizes means-ends alignment and unity
of effort. 26 Further, mechanistic routine should be avoided, as such
routine risks producing “unimaginative, pedestrian and predictable”
strategies the adversary can “easily anticipate and counter.”27
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 asserts the configuration of strategy
cannot rest on “inadequate” ends-ways-means-risks/costs calculations.
The strategy formulation process demands military leaders articulate
ways to “impose order on the environment” and “generate friendly
advantages over the adversary.”28 Politicians are relevant to the strategymaking process insofar as they must designate “the limits of actions and
resources available.”29 Beyond that point, military leaders must translate
strategy’s conceptual narrative for “supporting military campaigns” into
operational plans. Strategy development is a “function of [operational]
creative art.”30
Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 recognizes strategic effectiveness
benefits from the incorporation of various civilian and military
perspectives in the strategy-making process. The document suggests
rationality and ingenuity are also critical to the attainment of political
ends. The language of JDN 2-19, however, implies strategy operates in
service of operational art and design (respectively, the cognitive and
methodological frameworks for producing an operational approach)
rather than the inverse.31 Strategy formulation, 2-19 implies, leaves
little room for consideration of the ambition or ambiguities of political
ends—such considerations exist within the realm of campaign
management. This approach may result in stovepiped, if not limited,
civilian participation in strategy making. Likening strategy development
to operational design, which entails standardized planning, JDN 2-19
encapsulates technocratic biases for securing “order” and “advantage”
over ends.32

Strategy Implementation
Comparison. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 and JDN 2-19 also differ
from each other on strategy implementation. While 1-18 accepts that
environmental conditions should inform strategy, it ranks political
ends as the most critical determinant of strategic behavior.33 The note
concedes strategic approaches, or ways—observation, accommodation,
25. JCS, JDN 1-18, vii.
26. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-8.
27. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-4.
28. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-2.
29. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-2.
30. JCS, JDN 2-19, I-1, II-3, vi.
31. JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1; and JCS, Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2017), xxi, IV-1, IV-4–IV-6.
32. Regarding standardization, see JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1.
33. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2–III-3.
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compromise, shaping, persuasion, enabling, inducing, assurance,
deterrence, compellence, subduing, and eradication—differ in
accordance with political objectives and strategic circumstances. Varying
conditions along the strategic competition continuum may only call for
nonkinetic shaping operations; indeed, they may require the military do
nothing but hold, wait, and observe.34
Like its predecessor document, JDN 2-19 acknowledges strategic
activity serves political ends. Yet 2-19 more specifically pegs strategy
implementation to other priority factors. A strategic approach
should expressly accommodate “variables in the environment,” “the
organization [the strategy] serves,” and the tools of operational art.35
The document limits its coverage of strategic ways to assurance, coercion
(deterrence and compellence), and forcible action. While 2-19 does not
ascribe a particular strategy type to “forcible action,” it notes such action
entails pitting “strength against strength” to “remove . . . the enemy’s
ability to hold the initiative” and “subdue the enemy.”36 Thus, forcible
action seems synonymous with the offensive.
Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 suggests a broad and flexible
range of strategic approaches, including nonkinetic and shaping
strategies, hold utility for addressing political ends in the face of change
and uncertainty.37 In contrast, JDN 2-19 treads familiar territory,
fixing strategic behavior to organizational interests in and operational
art’s tools for assuring order over environmental variables.38 By this
logic, strategic action is largely synonymous with, and perhaps even
subservient to, operational art. Further, 2-19 implies that securing order
over the environment (particularly through kinetic operations) is apt to
call for offensive and forcible action, which the text depicts in terms that
roughly characterize strategies of annihilation and attrition.39
Whereas 1-18 treats strategy implementation as the realization of
political-military integration designs, 2-19 links strategy implementation
to organizational interests in creating and sustaining competitive
advantage. But strategic activity cannot be confined to operations alone.
Exclusive focus on operational art risks forsaking strategic effectiveness
for a business-as-usual implementation process.

Strategy Assessment
Comparison. Assessment weighs the suitability of military activity
to “the strategic situation,” the designated end, and “its subordinate
objectives” and requires estimates of one’s—and the adversary’s—aims,
34. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2.
35. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3, II-1, III-1, II-5.
36. JCS, JDN 2-19, IV-1, II-3–II-5.
37. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-2–III-3, viii–ix.
38. JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3.
39. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 13–25.
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capabilities, and strategic circumstances.40 Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
advances conceptual guidance for “permeat[ing]” ends-ways-meansrisks/costs estimates across dynamic political ends and environmental
conditions.41 Assessments are not only critical gauges of a strategy’s likely
effects but serve as validity tests of underlying strategic assumptions and
the broader strategic situation.42 Absent recognition of this function,
assessments serve “tactical and operational gains, but not . . . desired
political objectives.”43
Accordingly, JDN 1-18 warns against reliance on “magic formula[s]
for calculating risk” or standardized protocols for guaranteeing estimate
accuracy. Allowing that even effective strategies require updating for
continued success, the document prioritizes prudence, urging strategists
to refine skills for “recognizing and avoiding” assessment traps.44
In contrast, JDN 2-19 adopts a notably different approach to
assessment, calling for “a formal methodology to assess . . . risk”—
specifically covered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Joint Risk Assessment.
The manual upholds risk as “the probability and consequence of an
event causing harm to something valued” and centers predominantly
on estimates of environmental risk.45 The “Joint Risk Assessment
Model,” which purports to ensure risk can be capably managed utilizing
“objective” measurements, is central to the manual.46 The model
incorporates and depends upon the specification of risk calculation and
risk classification formulas.47 Though Joint Risk Assessment situates this
model within a broader “strategic planning construct,” the manual says
relatively little about the relationship between risk and strategy, or how
risk estimates might assist to gauge a strategy’s likely or actual effects
(particularly with respect to ends).48
Analysis. Though they employ intermittently overlapping terminology,
JDN 1-18 and JDN 2-19 depict assessment in discernably different
terms.49 JDN 1-18 regards assessment as a complex and imperfect
process and urges strategists to seek broadly analytical and holistic
impressions of ends-ways-means-risks/costs estimates. The document
implies individual discretion and expertise, not necessarily technocratic
procedures and objective measures, hold considerable utility for
establishing present strategic impact or future strategic direction. JDN
2-19 ostensibly gives precedence, instead, to the assessment of risk
40. JCS, JDN 1-18, III-4; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 63–71; Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, third
revised and expanded edition (New York: Routledge, 2001), 236–48; and Clausewitz, On War,
585–86.
41. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1, ix.
42. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1–IV-6, II-2 (Figure II-1).
43. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-5.
44. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1, IV-2, IV-4.
45. JCS, JDN 2-19, VI-1; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Risk Analysis,
CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019).
46. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, B-1, 4–5, 7.
47. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, 4–5, 7.
48. JCS, CJCSM 3105.01, A-2.
49. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-1; and JCS, JDN 2-19, VI-I.
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absent its relation to strategy, conveying seeming indifference to the
broader requirements of assessment or the matter of how they might
impact strategic effectiveness.
While the assessment content in JDN 2-19 does not specifically
hint at the prioritization of offense, discussions of assessment do center
on organizational concerns that drive the propensity for offense: risk
(more broadly, uncertainty) inherent to the security environment. In
short, JDN 2-19’s emphasis on (environmental) risk assessment reflects
operational predilections for mitigating uncertainty.

Strategy Innovation and Adaptation
Comparison. Changing circumstances are apt to require strategic
updating. Updating may take the form of innovation over the long-term
or grand-scale change “institutionalized across an entire organization”—a
new doctrine, organizational framework, or technology.50 Alternatively,
updating may take the form of incremental adaptation based on
knowledge gleaned in combat and carried out during the immediacy
of war. As JDN 1-18 observes, “No strategy is infallible . . . significant
changes in the strategic situation should force the strategist to adjust
the strategy’s ends, means, and/or ways.”51 Strategic updating may be
responsive to changes in the security environment, but these updates
ultimately serve “[n]ational interests and policies.”52 Joint Doctrine Note
1-18 cautions against innovating or adapting by rote. The note further
warns that organizational blinders and standard operating procedures
undercut the “objectivity, open-mindedness, insight, and/or creativity”
required for augmenting strategy in accordance with a variable strategic
situation or evolving political ends.53
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 acknowledges the national military strategy
links force innovation and adaptation to the “requirements of law, policy,
and defense strategy.”54 But the note predominantly centers on the
organizational determinants of innovation (force design) and adaptation
(force development). Force design involves testing new concepts against
mid- to long-term “challenges in the strategic environment,” while force
development entails identifying “capability requirements” for countering
near-to mid-term challenges.55 Force design and force development
reinforce the organization’s purpose and reflect the senior leader’s vision
for its future direction. Organizational-level innovation and adaptation
encompass, naturally, organizational interests in shaping future
investments.56 Notably, however, JDN 2-19 does not include substantive
coverage of either strategic innovation or strategic adaptation.
50. Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); and Theo Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British
in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567–94.
51. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-3.
52. JCS, JDN 1-18, II-1.
53. JCS, JDN 1-18, IV-6.
54. JCS, JDN 2-19, III-1.
55. JCS, JDN 2-19, V-1–V-2, III-1.
56. JCS, JDN 2-19, III-2, V-1.
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Analysis. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 accounts for the innovation and
adaptation of strateg y in light of changing political ends and emerging
environmental challenges, and for the possibility that updating
mechanistically can undermine the likelihood of strategic effectiveness,
potentially undercutting the “better or more permanent . . . condition.”57
In contrast, JDN 2-19 seemingly shows greater concern for the
innovation and adaptation of capabilities in alignment with organizational
purpose and the vision of senior military leaders.58 Though it briefly
acknowledges force innovation and adaptation share links to policy,
2-19 heavily implies military means are more apt to guide political ends
than the inverse. Because the note prioritizes updating capabilities to
the neglect of updating strategy, it intimates political ends are essentially
static and largely dependent on means alone.

Conclusion

Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 aligns with JDN 1-18 in several respects.
Both define strategy in means-ends terms. Both account for the
dynamism and ambiguity of political ends and the strategic environment.
And both recognize military strategy operates at several levels, involves
diverse actors, and crosses multiple time horizons. The two documents
also differ from each other in meaningful ways. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18
reveals consistent adherence to the classical strategy archetype, admits
that means-ends integration is rife with, but responsive to, obstacles,
and warns against the adoption of technocratic solutions to strategic
dilemmas. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 exhibits clear departures from
the classical strategy model, conveys an apparent preoccupation with
environment over ends, and suggests a predisposition for technocracy.
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 gives considerable lip service to strategy’s
means-ends integration logic. Initially, the note accedes that policy
guides strategic choice and action, and the text further distinguishes
military strategy from institutional strategy, planning, campaign plans,
and the organizational determinants of force development and design.59
Yet in subsequent chapters, JDN 2-19 focuses on those exact subjects—
institutional strategy, planning, campaign plans, and organizational
mechanisms for shaping future capabilities. These chapters broadly
overlook the political-military dimensions and discourse inherent
to strategy.
Likewise, 2-19 explicitly states the purpose of an institutional strategy
is to “[translate] higher-level policy,” yet the text simultaneously suggests
the starting point for institutional strategy is securing or maintaining
operational advantages for the institution.60 These two logics cannot
coexist without one eclipsing the other, and in effect, JDN 2-19’s
preference for organizational and operational prescriptions belie its
stated concern for means-ends integration. This approach further
57.
58.
59.
60.

JCS, JDN 1-18, III-1, IV-1, III-3–III-4.
JCS, JDN 2-19, III-1–III-2.
JCS, JDN 2-19, II-3, III-2.
JCS, JDN 2-19, III-2.
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informs and reinforces the notion that strategy rests on generating
friendly advantages. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19’s particular concern for
the attainment of edge over ends aligns with theoretical and historical
accounts of the military organizational pathology for offense.
Comprehensively, JDN 2-19 risks distorting the foundational logic
of military strategy and legitimizing the substitution of organizational
impulse for means-ends integration. Its reflection of organizational and
technocratic biases, particularly those which undergird the preference
for offense, warrant concern. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 falls shy of
accounting for the possibility that organizational aims do not necessarily
serve national security ends. Further, this perspective hazards a
willingness to accept “edge” as an end unto itself, rather than a means to
national security ends and raises important questions for consideration.
Does JDN 2-19 imply environmental variables merit regulation but
political dynamics warrant avoidance? Does the document discount the
need for active political and military participation across the strategy
cycle? As articulated, does JDN 2-19 hazard a propensity to evade rather
than engage with the civil-military complexities of strategy?
The assumption that military strategy distinctively hinges on
the establishment and preservation of friendly advantages does not
adequately account for contemporary security realities. The notion is
both reductive and dangerous, given the possibility competitors may
perceive overt bids for edge—particularly under shifting geopolitical
realities—as offensive threats. The United States can ill afford to accept
the risks of adventurism, or assume further costs to finite national
resources, under conditions of mounting great-power rivalry.
The collapse of the American “unipolar moment” calls for
restraint in the realms of both grand strategy and military strategy.61
The reemergence of interstate strategic competition suggests the
United States cannot afford to “cow all potential challengers” and
“comfort all coalition partners.”62 Further, America should not risk
enticing adversaries to conflict. Yet strategy that hinges on the quest
for persistent military edge quite plausibly involves significant costs and
risks, including arms races, war spirals, and strategic failures.
The disjuncture between the language of JDN 2-19 and the need
for strategic prudence is a relic of the unipolar moment and is indicative
of the “strategic atrophy” that the Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strateg y warns against.63 Decades of US strategic drift—exemplified by
the interventionism of the 1990s, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011
participation in the NATO strikes on Libya, and the January 2020
drone strike on Qassem Soleimani—call for greater engagement with
61. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990): 23–33.
62. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,”
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–97): 32.
63. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1.
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the political dimensions of strategy.64 The drone strike, carried out just
weeks after the publication of JDN 2-19, continues to draw scrutiny.
Questions of legality aside, the strike’s underlying objectives, and thus
the matter of its strategic effectiveness, remain largely unclear.65 The fact
that JDN 2-19’s thematic content is broadly consonant with the character
of the strike—assertion of force absent delineation of purpose—suggests
the need for a more rigorous approach to military strategy.
Future strategists will be called on to devise increasingly flexible,
adaptive, and resource-efficient options for countering great-power
competitors, confronting the persistent condition of terrorism and
addressing human security challenges such as pandemics. Joint
Doctrine Note 1-18 provides an imperfect but utilitarian roadmap for
matching military means to political ends. The document’s coverage
of tools for recognizing and surmounting strategic dilemmas, and
its inclusion of historical cases in which political-military discourse
is central to the resolution of those dilemmas, could prove critical to
future strategists.
It may be the case that JDN 1-18 encapsulates the exception to—
and not the rule of—US strategic pursuits, and that JDN 2-19, in turn,
represents a conventional preference for the American way of battle.
As military leaders determine whether to forge ahead with offensive
conceptions of strategy or relink strategy to its political underpinnings,
they should recall Joint Doctrine Notes are not definitive but instead
represent an ever-evolving discussion about the foundational tenets of
military strategy. Strategy may yet be salvaged from its detractors and
employed to purposeful effect.
Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 encompasses constructive updates to US
strategic thought. Facets of JDN 2-19—its consideration of innovation,
for example—appropriately account for substantive gaps in JDN 1-18.
Further, this evaluation of 2-19 is far from exhaustive, warranting
circumspect rather than definitive projections about the note’s
implications for future strategic effectiveness. It is entirely plausible
JDN 2-19 mirrors military leaders’ frustration with the struggle of
political officials to identify or resource adequately the aims of the US
unipolar moment, the counterterrorism decade, or the initial return to
interstate strategic competition. Faced with such conditions, it seems
reasonable doctrine might prioritize environment and edge over the
political ends.
Yet as Betts reminds us, strategists are often plagued by ambitious
or ambiguous political objectives; they are the hallmarks of strategy’s
64. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S.
Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018).
65. Natasha Turak, “ ‘Dangerous Escalation’ and ‘Severe Revenge’: The World Responds to
the US Killing of Iran’s Top General,” CNBC, updated January 5, 2020, https://www
.cnbc.com/2020/01/03/qasem-soleimani-death-world-responds-to-us-assassination
-of-irans-top-general.html; and Tamara Wittes, “Around the Halls: Experts React to the Killing of
Iranian Commander Qassem Soleimani,” Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, January 3,
2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/03/around-the-halls-experts
-react-to-the-killing-of-iranian-commander-qassem-soleimani/.
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illusory nature.66 These hallmarks call for the persistent and rigorous
pursuit of political-military integration. They do not provide justifiable
cause for removing strategy from its purpose.
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